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Abstract:  
A monopoly decides whether to segment two separate markets. Demand depends on 
stochastic shocks ad some buyers are uninformed about the quality of the good. 
Contrary to the case of complete information, we show that it is not always more 
profitable for the firm to segment the markets in an environment in which some buyers 
have incomplete information. The reason is that the presence of uninformed buyers 
provides the firm with the incentive to engage in noisy price-signaling. Indeed, if the 
benefit from price flexibility (through market segmentation) is offset by the cost of 
signaling quality through two distinct prices, then it is optimal not to segment the markets 
and to use uniform pricing. 
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1 Introduction
In an environment of complete information, it is always profitable for a
monopoly to segment markets and engage in (third-degree) price discrim-
ination.1 The reason is that setting different prices – a lower price in the
market segments with greater price elasticity and a higher price in those
with lower price elasticity – allows the firm to capture more of the consumer
surplus in each market. However, little is known on whether market seg-
mentation is always profitable under incomplete information on the part of
buyers.
In this paper, we show that in an environment of incomplete information,
market segmentation is not necessarily the more profitable pricing strategy.
Specifically, we show that segmenting the markets is not always profitable
when some buyers do not know the quality of the good and the firm reacts by
engaging in price signaling. Indeed, when confronted with incomplete infor-
mation on the demand side, the firm faces a trade-off in choosing to segment
or integrate the markets. On the one hand, market segmentation yields more
flexibility and the ability to capture a greater share of the consumer surplus.
On the other hand, market segmentation implies that the firm signals quality
with two prices instead of one. Hence, two prices are distorted from their
complete information counterpart, whereas only one price is when markets
are integrated. If the signaling cost (due to the distortion in the prices) is
higher under market segmentation than under market integration, then it
is possible that the loss due to signaling outweighs the benefit from price
flexibility. We find that the higher the number of informed buyers, the more
similar the market segments have to be for market integration to be the more
profitable option. We also find that it is more likely that market integration
be optimal when uninformed buyers are numerous and originate from the
market segment with the higher willingness to pay.
The question of whether market integration is optimal is closely related
1Third-degree price discrimination is feasible as long as there is some easily observ-
able characteristic by which a firm can group buyers and arbitrage can be prevented.
See Schmalensee (1981) and Tirole (1988) for a detailed discussion on third-degree price
discrimination.
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to the question of whether uniform pricing for differentiated goods is opti-
mal. In both problems, the benefits of the increased price flexibility need to
be compared to the costs of charging different prices. Some recent papers
(McMillan, 2007; Orbach and Einav, 2007; Chen, 2009; Chen and Cui, 2013;
Richardson and Sta¨hler, 2013) study such question in the context of differ-
entiated goods. The present paper contributes partially to this strand of
the literature by identifying a cost to charging different prices in a signaling
context. Hence, we provide a glimpse to what incomplete information can
yield when goods are differentiated.
At last, our work is related to several papers in international economics
investigating the non-optimality of charging different prices for different mar-
kets (Friberg, 2001; Asplund and Friberg, 2000). However, these papers do
not study the optimality of market segmentation (or integration) in a noisy
signaling environment. Friberg (2001) studies whether a firm selling in re-
gions with different currencies should segment the markets with an emphasis
on the impact of the exchange rate, whereas Asplund and Friberg (2000)
focus on the transportation cost from one region to another.2 We do not
explore these issues here, but rather provide an information-based reason for
the profitability of market integration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and Section 3 provides conditions under which it is more profitable to
integrate the markets. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we present a model in which a monopoly decides whether
or not to segment the market for a good whose quality is unknown to some
buyers. Our model has two stages. At the first stage, the firm decides whether
or not to split the market into two separate markets. At the second stage,
the firm sets one price if there is no market segmentation and two prices
otherwise. In either case, the firm takes into account the fact that prices can
2Other papers such as Friberg (2003), Friberg and Martensen (2001) and Gallo (2010)
study the profitability of market segmentation in the context of a duopoly.
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provide partial information about quality to the uninformed buyers. We first
describe the markets and then present the decisions of the firm at each stage.
Consider a firm selling a good of quality µ > 0 in markets A and B. In
market A, the buyers are informed, i.e., they know µ. Aggregate demand in
market A is given by
QA(PA, µ, ηA) = µ− PA + ηA (1)
where ηA is a demand shock that is unobserved by the buyers. The difference
in demand between markets A and B is two-fold. The first difference concerns
information. Unlike market A, market B is composed of both informed and
uninformed buyers. Specifically, a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of the buyers knows µ
and thus a fraction 1−λ does not know µ. Although the uninformed buyers
have prior beliefs about µ, they also extract partial information about quality
from observing prices, i.e., noisy price signaling. That is, upon observing
prices, the uninformed buyers’ posterior mean for quality is
∫
xξˆ(x|PA, PB)dx
where ξˆ(·|PA, PB) is the posterior p.d.f. of µ˜ given PA and PB.3 The second
difference is that conditional on µ, the buyers in market B have a reservation
price γµ where γ > 0 reflects the disparity in demand between the two
markets (unless γ = 1). Aggregate demand in market B is thus given by
QB(PB, µ, ξˆ(·|PA, PB), ηB) = λ(γµ−PB)+(1−λ)
(
γ
∫
xξˆ(x|PA, PB)dx− PB
)
+ηB
(2)
where ηB is a demand shock that is unobserved by the buyers and
∫
xξˆ(x|PA, PB)dx
is the posterior mean of µ and reflects the learning activity of the uninformed
buyers.
Before proceeding with the behavior of the firm at each stage, it is use-
ful to present the timing of all decisions and the information available to
all agents. Except for the quality parameter µ and the demand shocks ηA
and ηB, all the other parameters of the model (including the uninformed
3Note that ξˆ(·|PA, PB) is the general expression for posterior beliefs upon observing
two signals. If there is no market segmentation, then the uninformed buyers receive two
identical signals, i.e., P ≡ PA = PB . In that case, posterior beliefs can be simplified to
ξˆ(·|P ).
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Stage 2Stage 1
Firm observes {ηA, ηB}.
Conditional on D ,
firm sets {PA, PB} or P .
Buyers observe price(s),
update beliefs (if uninformed),
and purchase the good.
Firm observes µ
and chooses D ∈ {NS, S}.
Figure 1: Timeline
buyers’ prior beliefs and the distribution of the demand shocks) are public
knowledge. More specifically, at the first stage, the firm observes the quality,
but not the demand shocks.4 The firm decides whether or not to segment
the markets by comparing the expected profit under segmentation with the
expected profit under no segmentation, rationally anticipating the demand
shocks as well as the learning activity of the uninformed buyers. Formally,
let D ∈ {NS,S} be the firm’s decision in the first stage. If D = NS, then
there is No market Segmentation, whereas D = S stands for market Seg-
mentation. At the second stage, the firm observes the demand shocks and
sets the price(s). The uninformed buyers do not know the quality and do
not observe the demand shocks.5 Upon observing the price(s), the buyers
update beliefs (if uninformed), and purchase the good. Figure 1 summarizes
the timeline.
We now describe formally the behavior of the firm at each stage.6 We
begin with the second stage. If the markets are not segmented, then the
firm sets one price. Using (1) and (2) evaluated at P ≡ PA = PB, stage-2
maximization problem (given D = NS) is
ΠNS(µ, ηA, ηB) = max
P
{
P ·
(
QA(P, µ, ηA) +QB(P, µ, ξˆNS(·|P ), ηB)
)}
. (3)
If the markets are segmented, then the firm sets a price in each market.
4This reflects the idea that the firm faces some uncertainty in demand before making
a decision about market segmentation.
5The fact that the buyers do not observe the demand shocks conveys the idea that
the firm knows more about demand than the buyers do. Moreover, this informational
asymmetry enables prices to provide partial (noisy) information about the quality of the
good.
6A definition of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is provided in Appendix A.
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Using (1) and (2), given that the firm has decided to segment the market at
stage 1, stage-2 maximization problem (given D = S) is
ΠS(µ, ηA, ηB) = max
PA,PB
{
PA ·QA(PA, µ, ηA) + PB ·QB(PB, µ, ξˆS(·|PA, PB), ηB)
}
.
(4)
Note that from (3) and (4), the firm’s expected profits are influenced by the
uninformed buyers’ posterior mean. In particular, the p.d.f.’s ξˆNS(·|P ) and
ξˆS(·|PA, PB) are different functions because the uninformed buyers rationally
anticipate the firm’s decision to segment or integrate the market at the first
stage. In the next section, it is shown that in equilibrium, the buyers cor-
rectly conjecture whether the market is segmented because the firm’s decision
at the first stage is independent of the quality µ and the realized demand
shocks ηA and ηB.
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Next, at the first stage, the firm decides whether to segment the market
by comparing expected profits under no market segmentation and market
segmentation. To see this, let the tuple {{P ∗NS(µ, ηA, ηB), {P ∗A,S(µ, ηA, ηB),
P ∗B,S(µ, ηB, ηA)}}, {ξˆ∗NS(·|PA, PB), ξˆ∗S(·|P )}} define the equilibrium at the sec-
ond stage. Specifically, P ∗NS(µ, ηA, ηB) and {P ∗A,S(µ, ηA, ηB), P ∗B,S(µ, ηB, ηA)}
are the firm’s price strategies under no market segmentation and market
segmentation, respectively. The terms ξˆ∗NS(·|P ) and ξˆ∗S(·|PA, PB) are the un-
informed buyers’ posterior beliefs under no market segmentation and market
segmentation, respectively. Given these strategies and posterior beliefs at
stage 2, the expected profits of the firm under no market segmentation and
market segmentation are
E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] = E
[
P ∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B) ·
(
QA(P
∗
NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B), µ, η˜A)
+QB(P
∗
NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B), µ, ξˆ
∗
NS(·|P ∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)), η˜B)
)]
(5)
7The fact that the firm’s decision in the first stage is independent of µ is a consequence
of the distributional assumptions and of the demand specification. The independence from
the realized demand shocks follows from the fact that the firm does not observe ηA and
ηB at the first stage.
6
and
E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] = E[P ∗A,S(µ, η˜A, η˜B) ·QA(P ∗A,S(µ, η˜A, η˜B), µ, η˜A)] + E[P ∗B,S(µ, η˜B, η˜A)
·QB(P ∗B,S(µ, η˜B, η˜A), µ, ξˆ∗S(·|P ∗A,S(µ, η˜A, η˜B), P ∗B,S(µ, η˜B, η˜A)), η˜B)],
(6)
respectively. Here, E[·] is the expectation operator over {η˜A, η˜B} where a tilde
sign is used to distinguish a random variable from its realization. Hence, at
the first stage, using (5) and (6), the firm chooses not to split the two markets
(i.e., D∗ = NS) when
E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] > E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)]. (7)
3 On the Profitability of Market Integration
Having presented the model, we now provide conditions under which (7) holds.
Specifically, we show that the presence of uninformed buyers (inducing the
firm to engage in noisy signaling) makes it possible for the firm to obtain
higher expected profits by not segmenting the market. To characterize the
equilibrium, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. Prior beliefs are µ˜ ∼ N(ρ, σ2µ), with ρ > 0. Distributions
of demand shocks are η˜A ∼ N(0, σ2η), η˜B ∼ N(0, σ2η) such that E[η˜Aη˜B] = 0.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we discuss the distributional assump-
tion for the uninformed buyers’ prior beliefs and the random demand shocks.
From Assumption 3.1, we rely on the fact that the family of normal dis-
tributions with an unknown mean is a conjugate family for samples from a
normal distribution.8 With the normality assumption, we obtain a unique
8Normal assumption combined with linear demand yields closed-form equilibrium val-
ues and makes the analysis tractable by focusing on the mean and variance of price and
posterior beliefs. See Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle (1985), Judd and Riordan (1994),
and Mirman et al. (2013) for the use of normal distributions to study the informational
role of prices in single-agent problems (without market segmentation). See also Vives
(2011) for the use of normal distributions in a rational expectations environment.
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linear equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium in which the uninformed buyers’ pos-
terior mean is linear in the price-signals. Although negative demand shocks
can yield a negative price or a negative posterior mean, the values of the
parameters of the model can be restricted to ensure that the probability of
such events be arbitrarily close to zero. Moreover, it turns out that, for any
parameters, equilibrium values for mean prices are always positive.
We now provide the equilibrium expected profits for each possible state
in stage 2 (i.e., D = NS and D = S) when the uninformed buyers have
unbiased beliefs about the unknown quality (i.e., ρ = µ).9 Proposition 3.2
shows that regardless of the firm’s decision to segment or integrate the mar-
kets, second-stage expected profits are the sum of two components. The
first component is the full-information expected profits, i.e., when all buyers
are informed (i.e., λ = 1). The second component is a cost that emanates
from the firm’s need to signal quality via prices. Indeed, in order to sig-
nal the quality of the good to the uninformed buyers, the firm alters prices.
This distortion in prices translates into a loss in expected profits. Formally,
from (9) and (11) in Proposition 3.2, −C∗NSµ2 ≤ 0 and −C∗Sµ2 ≤ 0 denote
the loss in expected profits (due to signaling) under no market segmentation
and market segmentation, respectively.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds. Then, there exists
an equilibrium in the second stage. Suppose further that prior beliefs are
unbiased, i.e., ρ = µ. Then, stage-2 expected profits are
1. For D∗ = NS,
E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] =
(1 + γ)2µ2
8
− C∗NSµ2, (8)
where
C∗NS =
(1− λ)2(1 + γ)2(1 + γλ)2γ2σ4µ
8(2σ2η + (1 + γ)(1 + γλ)σ
2
µ)
2
. (9)
9The firm’s expected profits may also be higher under market integration when buyers’
beliefs are biased. However, the firm’s decision to split the market depends on prior beliefs
as well as quality.
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2. For D∗ = S,
E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] =
(1 + γ2)µ2
4
− C∗Sµ2, (10)
where
C∗S =
(1− λ)2(1 + γ2λ2)γ4σ4µ
4(σ2η + 2(1 + γ
2λ)σ2ησ
2
µ + (1 + γ
2)(1 + γ2λ2)σ4µ)
. (11)
Proof. See Appendix B.
One comment about Proposition 3.2 is warranted. From (8) and (10),
expected profits are linear in µ2. As a result, the firm’s decision to segment or
integrate the market is independent of µ. As noted earlier in Footnote 7, this
implies that the uninformed buyers correctly conjecture whether the market
is segmented. It also implies that observing two different prices and thus
inferring that the markets are segmented brings no additional information
about µ since the firm’s decision at stage 1 is uninformative about µ.10
Using Proposition 3.2, we now turn to our main result, i.e., under noisy
signaling, it is possible for the firm to choose not to segment the market. We
begin by stating the well-known benchmark case of full information when all
buyers are informed, i.e., λ = 1. If every buyer is informed, then it is always
profitable for a firm to segment the market. Indeed, in that case, there is
no loss in expected profits due to signaling. That is, from (9) and (11),
C∗NS |λ=1 = C∗NS |λ=1 = 0. Hence, the flexibility of using two prices always
yields higher expected profits.
Remark 3.3. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds. Then, from (8) and (10),
E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)]|λ=1 < E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)]|λ=1.
Remark 3.3 implies that a necessary condition for the firm to prefer not to
segment the market is the presence of uninformed buyers, which is related to
the loss (due to signaling) in expected profits. Indeed, in order to offset the
benefit from price flexibility (by segmenting the market), it is necessary (but
10In other words, the ordering of (8) and (10) is independent of µ.
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Figure 2: Comparison of C∗NS and C
∗
S. The shaded area C
∗
S > C
∗
NS regroups
the set of pairs {γ, λ} for which the loss in expected profits (due to signaling) is
greatest under market segmentation.
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not sufficient) for the loss in expected profits under market segmentation to
be greater than the loss in expected profits under no market segmentation.
For λ ∈ (0, 1), it is possible that C∗S > C∗NS . Figure 2 depicts the region of
the parameters space {λ, γ} corresponding to C∗S > C∗NS .
Proposition 3.4 establishes the condition under which the firm chooses
not to segment the market. Condition (12) compares the gains and losses in
expected profits from integrating the markets. Intuitively, the firm faces a
trade-off. On the one hand, market segmentation yields more flexibility and
the ability to capture more of the consumer surplus. On the other hand, the
firm also has to incur a signaling cost, i.e., the distortion needed to signal
quality via prices depends on whether the market is integrated or separated.
Specifically, the firm does not segment the market if there is a reduction in
cost due to signaling (i.e., C∗S − C∗NS > 0) which is greater than the loss
from price flexibility (i.e. (1 − γ)2/8). While there is always a loss from
price flexibility (unless the markets are identical), the reduction in cost due
to signaling depends on the parameter values.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds and that λ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
at the first stage, the firm does not segment the market (i.e., D∗ = NS) if
and only if
C∗S − C∗NS ≥ (1− γ)2/8 (12)
where C∗NS and C
∗
S are given by (9) and (11), respectively.
Proof. From (8) and (10),
E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)]− E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] =
µ2
8
[−(1− γ)2 − 8C∗NS + 8C∗S] , (13)
which implies (12).
Note that market integration is optimal even in the case of identical reser-
vation prices across the two markets. i.e., γ = 1.11 In that case, the loss in
expected profits due to signaling is always larger under market segmentation.
11There is still a difference between the two markets because there are some uninformed
buyers in market B.
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That is, from (9) and (11), C∗S |γ=1 > C∗NS |γ=1 > 0. Hence, since there is no
benefit in price flexibility when γ = 1, the firm always prefers to integrate
the markets.12
It is convenient to depict the condition stated in Proposition 3.4. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates Proposition 3.4 by showing the region of the parameters
space {λ, γ} corresponding to E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] > E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)].13 The
firm chooses not to segment the markets when the fraction of informed buy-
ers is low enough and the reservation price on market B is either almost
similar to the one of market A, or higher. In terms of the parameters, this
implies that λ is low and γ is either just a little below 1, or above. This is
consistent with the decomposition of expected profits provided in Proposi-
tion 3.2. Indeed, as noted, the firm faces a trade-off between a benefit from
price flexibility and a cost from having to signal quality from prices.
When γ is low, marketsA andB are very different and there is thus a great
gain from splitting the market and capturing the consumer surplus. That is,
the first component in (8) is higher than the first component in (10). When
the markets are similar, i.e., γ = 1, then in addition to generating no benefit,
signaling through the use of two prices is more costly than using a single
price. Consequently, the firm is better off by integrating the markets. The
same is true when γ is just a little below 1 as the benefit from segmentation
is small in comparison of the additional signaling cost C∗S −C∗NS . When γ is
above 1, for low level of λ, then the cost difference C∗S − C∗NS increases more
rapidly than the benefits. Hence, the firm is still better off by integrating the
markets. Finally, as λ decreases, the effect of signaling on profit increases.
When distorting two prices is more costly than distorting one price, the
second component in (8) is higher than the component in (10).
12That is, from (8) and (10), E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)]|γ=1 > E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)]|γ=1.
13From Figures 2 and 3, if the firm chooses not to segment the market, then the loss
(due to signaling) in expected profits is always greater under market segmentation.
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Figure 3: Comparison of E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] and E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)]. The shaded
area E[Π∗S ] < E[Π∗NS ] regroups the set of pairs {γ, λ} for which the expected profits
is greatest under no market segmentation.
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4 Conclusion
Under complete information on the part of buyers, a monopoly obtains a
higher expected profit by charging difference price for market segments hav-
ing different price elasticities. We show that this conclusion does not hold
when some buyers have incomplete information about the quality of the good
they consider purchasing and the firm engages in price signaling. The analy-
sis presented in this paper complements the analysis in Gendron-Saulnier and
Santugini (2013). They both outline an important difference regarding the
effect of market segmentation between complete and incomplete information.
Indeed, Gendron-Saulnier and Santugini (2013) shows that the uninformed
buyers obtain an informational benefit when the firm segments the markets.
Hence, the conclusion that under complete information the firm gains while
all the buyers lose from market segmentation (if both markets are served
under market integration) are shown to be reversed under incomplete infor-
mation.
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A Equilibrium Definition
Definition A.1 states the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The equilibrium
consists of the firm’s strategy (a segmentation decision at stage 1 and prices
at stage 2), the distribution of the price-signals conditional on any quality x,
and the uninformed buyers’ posterior beliefs about the quality upon observing
any prices.14 In equilibrium, the posterior beliefs are consistent with Bayes’
rule and the equilibrium distribution of prices.
Definition A.1. The tuple {{D∗, {{P ∗NS(µ, ηA, ηB), {P ∗A,S(µ, ηA, ηB), P ∗B,S(µ, ηB, ηA)}}}},
{ξˆ∗NS(·|PA, PB), ξˆ∗S(·|P )}} is an equilibrium if, for all µ > 0,
1. At stage 2,
(a) For D∗ = NS,
i. Given ξˆ∗NS(·|P ), and for any ηA and ηB, the firm’s price strat-
egy is
P ∗NS(µ, ηA, ηB) = arg max
P
{
P ·
(
QA(P, µ, ηA) +QB(P, µ, ξˆ
∗
NS(·|P ), ηB)
)}
.
(14)
ii. Given the distribution of {η˜A, η˜B}, φ∗NS(P |x) is the p.d.f. of
the random price-signal P ∗NS(x, η˜A, η˜B) conditional on any qual-
ity x.
iii. Given φ∗NS(P |·) and prior beliefs ξ(·), the uninformed buyers’
posterior beliefs upon observing any P is µ˜∗|P with p.d.f.
ξˆ∗NS(x|P ) =
ξ(x)φ∗NS(P |x)∫
x′∈R ξ(x
′)φ∗NS(P |x′)dx′
, (15)
x ∈ R.
(b) For D∗ = S,
14The variable µ refers to the true quality whereas x is used as a dummy variable for
quality.
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i. Given ξˆ∗S(·|PA, PB), and for any ηA and ηB, the firm’s price
strategies are
{
P ∗A,S(µ, ηA, ηB), P
∗
B,S(µ, ηB, ηA)
}
= arg max
PA,PB
{
PA ·QA(PA, µ, ηA)
+ PB ·QB(PB, µ, ξˆ∗S(·|PA, PB), ηB)
}
.
(16)
ii. Given the distribution of {η˜A, η˜B}, φ∗S(PA, PB|x) is the p.d.f.
of the random price-signals
{
P ∗A,S(x, η˜A, η˜B), P
∗
B,S(x, η˜B, η˜A)
}
conditional on any quality x.
iii. Given φ∗S(PA, PB|·) and prior beliefs ξ(·), the uninformed buy-
ers’ posterior beliefs about quality upon observing PA and PB
is µ˜∗S |PA, PB with the p.d.f.
ξˆ∗S(x|PA, PB) =
ξ(x)φ∗S(PA, PB|x)∫
x′∈R ξ(x
′)φ∗S(PA, PB|x′)dx′
, (17)
x ∈ R.
2. At stage 1,
D∗ = arg max
D∈{NS,S}
1[D=NS] ·E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] +1[D=S] ·E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)]
(18)
where
E[Π∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] = E
[
P ∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B) ·
(
QA(P
∗
NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B), µ, η˜A)
+QB(P
∗
NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B), µ, ξˆ
∗
NS(·|P ∗NS(µ, η˜A, η˜B)), η˜B)
)]
(19)
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and
E[Π∗S(µ, η˜A, η˜B)] = E
[
P ∗A,S(µ, η˜A, η˜B) ·QA(P ∗A,S(µ, η˜A, η˜B), µ, η˜A)
]
+ E
[
P ∗B,S(µ, η˜B, η˜A)
·QB(P ∗B,S(µ, η˜B, η˜A), µ, ξˆ∗S(·|P ∗A,S(µ, η˜A, η˜B), P ∗B,S(µ, η˜B, η˜A)), η˜B)
]
.
(20)
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2. See Gendron-Saulnier and Santugini (2013) for
the existence of the equilibrium at the second stage.
1. If the markets are not segmented, then from Proposition 2.5 (Gendron-
Saulnier and Santugini, 2013), the firm’s price strategy is
P ∗NS(µ, ηA, ηB) =
β∗NSγ(1− λ) + (1 + γλ)µ+ ηA + ηB
4− 2β∗NSγ(1− λ)
(21)
and the uninformed buyers’ posterior mean is∫
xξˆ∗NS(x|P )dx = β∗0 + β∗1P (22)
where
β∗0 =
2ρσ2η
2σ2η + σ
2
µ(1 + γ + γλ+ γ
2λ)
, (23)
β∗1 =
4(1 + γλ)σ2µ
2σ2η + σ
2
µ(1 + 2γ + 2γ
2λ− γ2λ2) . (24)
Plugging (21) and (22) (evaluated at P = P ∗NS(µ, ηA, ηB)) into (5), set-
ting ρ = µ (for unbiased beliefs), and taking expectations over {η˜A, η˜B}
yields (8).
2. If the markets are segmented, then from Proposition 2.3 (Gendron-
17
Saulnier and Santugini, 2013), the firm’s price strategies are
P ∗A,S(µ, ηA, ηB) =
δ∗0δ
∗
1γ
2(1− λ)2 + (2− 2δ∗2γ(1− λ) + δ∗1γ2λ(1− λ))µ
4− δ∗21 γ2(1− λ)2 − 4δ∗2γ(1− λ)
+
(2− 2δ∗2γ(1− λ))ηA + δ∗1γ(1− λ)ηB
4− δ∗21 γ2(1− λ)2 − 4δ∗2γ(1− λ)
(25)
and
P ∗B,S(µ, ηB, ηA) =
2δ∗0γ(1− λ) + (δ∗1γ(1− λ) + 2γλ)µ+ δ∗1γ(1− λ)ηA + 2ηB
4− δ∗21 γ2(1− λ)2 − 4δ∗2γ(1− λ)
,
(26)
and the uninformed buyers’ posterior mean is∫
xξˆ∗S(x|PA, PB)dx = δ∗0 + δ∗1PA + δ∗2PB, (27)
where
δ∗0 =
ρσ2η
σ2η + σ
2
µ(1 + γ
2λ)
, (28)
δ∗1 =
2σ2µ
σ2η + σ
2
µ(1 + γ
2λ)
, (29)
δ∗2 =
2γ(λσ2µ(σ
2
η + 2σ
2
µ)− σ4µ(1− γ2λ2))
(σ2η + σ
2
µ(1 + γ
2λ))(σ2η + σ
2
µ(1 + γ
2λ(2− λ))) . (30)
Plugging (25), (26), and (27) (evaluated at PA = P
∗
A,S(µ, ηA, ηB) and
PB = P
∗
B,S(µ, ηB, ηA)) into (6), setting ρ = µ (for unbiased beliefs), and
taking expectations over {η˜A, η˜B} yields (10).
18
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